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Abstract: 
In recent years the topics of illegal activities such as corruption or tax evasion have 
attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial 
empirical evidence about the determinants of compliance. The aim of this paper is to 
investigate empirically whether women are more willing to be compliant than men 
focusing on corruption and tax evasion and whether we observe (among women and 
in general) differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time 
periods (cohort effect) or changing attitudes of the same cohorts over time (age 
effect).  Method. Thus, this paper will use data from eight Western European 
countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span 
the period from 1981 to 1999. Results. The results reveal higher willingness to 
comply among women and an age rather than a cohort effect. Conclusions. Thus, 
our results are in line with previous studies that found strong gender differences but 
are not in line with the equality and role theory that would suggest a decrease of 










Illegal activities are not a new phenomenon. Already 2000 years ago, the 
book  Arthashastra, written by Kautilya discussed corruption (see Tanzi, 2002). 
Corruption is a topic that has attracted important writers such as Dante and 
Shakespeare and bribery (besides treason) is one of the two explicitly mentioned 
crimes that could justify the impeachment of a U.S. president (see Noonan, 
1984). It is also interesting to note that in Ancient Egypt, the pharaohs searched 
for ways to reduce corruption of their tax collectors (called scribes). The scribes 
were paid high salaries to reduce the incentives to enrich themselves by cheating 
taxpayers. Furthermore, scribes working in the field were controlled by a group of 
special scribes from the head office. The famous Rosetta Stone, inscribed around 
200 B.C. during the reign of Ptolemy, did not only help to maintain the 
hieroglyphic knowledge, but it is also the first “tax-oriented” documentation which 
reports a tax amnesty, where tax rebels were released from prison, remitting also 
their tax debts. The success of the tax amnesty increased the incentive to use 
this instrument as a regular medicine to check civil disorder (see Adams, 1993). 
Even today, there is still a huge political interest in tax amnesty programs all 
around the world. Pharaohs were also confronted with the question how 
taxpayers should be treated. The tomb of Khiti describes a scene in which 
taxpayers were roughly treated by tax scribes, being for example clubbed with 
apparent ferocity (Adams, 1993, p. 8). 
However, still little is known about the causes of illegal activities such as 
corruption and tax evasion.  Interestingly, studies in the area of compliance are 





psychologists contributed to this area.  In general, studies strongly increased 
since the early 1990s. The transformation of the socialist economies was one of 
the main reasons for this surge in interests since institutional weaknesses and 
illegal activities surfaced as major obstacles to market reforms (Abed and Gupta 
2002). Moreover,  increased interest and new datasets contributed to a rapidly 
growing empirical literature (see Treisman, 2000; and Lambsdorff, 1999 for 
reviews on corruption, Andreoni et al., 1998 for tax compliance) to which we 
contribute.  
This empirical study analyses the World Values Survey (WVS, waves 1 
(1981-1984), and 2 (1990-1991)) and the European Values Survey data (EVS, 
1999-2000) to shed some light on whether gender differences matter. Moreover, 
we investigate women’s compliance attitudes over time to see whether we 
observe a cohort effect (differences in attitudes among similar age groups in 
d i f f e r e n t  t i m e  p e r i o d s )  o r / a n d  a n  a g e  effect (changing attitudes of the same 
cohort over time). Section 2 of the paper gives an overview of  the existing 
literature and has the aim to outline our theoretical approach. The 
interdisciplinary phenomenon of corruption and tax evasion makes it also 
interesting to focus on research findings in differences social science areas. Most 
of the studies used cross-section regressions, comparing people of different age 
cohorts at one point in time. Such investigations are not able to distinguish 
between a possible cohort and age effect. A cohort effect measures differences 
due to the experiences, characteristics or socialization process of a particular 





economic conditions may have similar attitudes towards various issues such as 
the justifiability of corruption. Conversely, an age effect measures differences due 
to chronological age or life course stage. An empirical analysis based on cross-
sectional data cannot be used to make this distinction. Separating between the 
two effects requires longitudinal data, which unfortunately are not available. 
Nonetheless, as we describe later in the paper, we can accomplish much in that 
direction by combining WVS/EVS survey data from different years. Section 3 then 
presents the empirical findings. We find strong and robust gender differences and 
a support for an age rather than a cohort effect for both dependent variables 




Are Women the Fairer Sex and Can We Observe Changes in Attitudes 
Over Time?  
 
Social psychological research suggests that women are more compliant and 
less self-reliant than men (e.g., Tittle, 1980). In the past decade, experimental 
research findings have shown that gender may influence various behaviors, e.g., 
charitable giving, bargaining, and household decision making (see Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2001). In public good games, the results 
are not clear. Some have found men to be more cooperative (see Brown-Kruse 
and Hummels, 1993), others have found that women are more cooperative 
(Nowell and Tinkler, 1994). Using dictator games, Andreoni and Vesterlund 





interestingly found that in expensive giving-situations, women are more generous 
than men and when the price of giving decreases, men start to give more than 
women. There is evidence from the tax compliance literature showing the 
tendency that men are less compliant and have a lower tax morale than women 
(for survey studies see, e.g., Vogel, 1974; Aitken and Bonneville, 1980; Tittle, 
1980; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; for experiments, Spicer and Becker, 1980; 
Spicer and Hero, 1985; Baldry, 1987). Evidence about gender differences can 
also be found in helping behavior (see, e.g., Eagly and Crowley, 1986) or ethical 
decision making (Ford et al., 1994; Glover et al., 1997 and Reiss and Mitra, 
1998).  
Less evidence is available in the area of corruption. Efforts to understand 
corruption and possible gender differences are highly relevant in the politico-
economic process.  It is a common belief that an increase in women’s 
representation in public organizations may reduce corruption. In 1999, Mexico set 
up new female uniformed patrols and increased the number of women police 
officers to reduce corruption (see TI, Press release, March, 2000). A similar policy 
has been introduced in Lima, Peru (see Swamy et al., 2001).  Dollar et al. (2001) 
is one of the first papers that investigate empirically the relationship between 
women’s government participation in legislatures and the level of perceived 
corruption, using a sample of between 144 and 270 observations (countries). As 
a measurement of corruption, they use the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) and women’s involvement in government has been proxied by the 





House. In the specification they control for the level of social and economic 
development and find that a higher presence of women parliamentarians had a 
statistically significant negative impact on corruption. Swamy et al. (2001) use 
several data sets to investigate the relationship between gender and corruption. 
They present macro-evidence working with the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index. Different proxies for possible gender differences, 
such as the percentage of women in parliament, as government ministers and in 
the labor force are considered. Controlling also for social, economic and political 
development they find that a higher share of women’s participation leads to a 
decrease in corruption. Robustness tests working with the Graft Index and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) also indicate that there are gender 
differences. The authors also present micro-evidence using data from a World 
Bank study of corruption in Georgia (survey of 350 firms). The findings also 
indicate a gender difference regarding the involvement in bribery. Finally, in line 
with our paper the authors investigate the World Values Survey. However, 
contrary to our paper they use only the older data sets (wave I and II (years 
1981-84 and 1990-1993) and only one dependent variable (justifiability of 
corruption). As control variables they considered the marital status, religiosity, 
education and age. However, only in 5 out of 21 in wave II and 9 out of 15 
countries in wave I we observe a statistically significant difference between 
women and men, although the sign of the male dummy variable was negative. On 
the other hand, pooling all data together leads to a statistically significant 





of a person. However, Sung (2003) criticizes the macro-results of both studies 
reporting that gender differences lose significance when the effects of 
constitutional liberalism are controlled for and refers to the important role of the 
judiciary and the press. Another study done by Mukherjee and Gokcekus (2004) 
investigates whether a higher percentage of women employed in public sector 
organizations reduces the level of corruption working with survey data covering 6 
countries provided by the World Bank.  Also contrary to the first two studies, their 
results imply that there is an optimal level of women in public organizations. In 
those organizations where less than one third of the employees are women, an 
increase in the proportion of women leads to a reduction of corruption. However, 
increasing the percentage of women beyond around 45% reduces the likelihood 
that corruption is reported and a value over 70% even raises corruption. Finally, 
Mocan (2004) investigates the determinants of corruption with the International 
Crime Victim Survey. The study uses the risk of exposure to bribery (having been 
asked for a bribe by a government official). The results indicate that men are 
more likely to be asked for a bribe than women.  
In general, more evidence is needed to see whether gender differences 
matter and whether promoting women’s employment could be a strategy to 
improve governance, reducing the level of corruption.  
Strong differences between men and women can also be observed in other 
circumstances. For example, there is a larger accident involvement in all kinds of 
motor vehicle accident rates for men than for women. But there are also 





caused by fire (see Junger, 1994). Similarly, alcohol and drug abuse are more 
common among men than women (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).  
The criminology literature provides one of the best sources to see possible 
gender differences. While the previously reviewed literature does not give a 
theoretical explanation of possible differences, the criminology literature presents 
theories that try to explain gender differences although the sources or meaning of 
these differences are still not fully understood. We will discuss the crime/deviancy 
literature that covers all the crime and delinquency together. Although corruption 
and tax evasion are not classic “white collar” crimes, they have nevertheless 
more in common with white collar crimes than with street crimes. Thus, it will be 
interesting to see whether results obtained in the criminology literature help to 
understand individuals’ attitudes towards corruption and tax evasion. The 
correlation between gender and crime or delinquent behavior has been 
adequately investigated (see, e.g., Steffensmeier et al., 1989; Steffensmeier and 
Streifel, 1991; Steffensmeier and Haynie, 2000). Some theories such as the 
equality or role theory would suggest that with greater equality of status between 
men and women there would be greater equality in their crime rates, as the 
opportunities to behave illegally increase for women (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 
1990). If this is the case, we would be able to observe a cohort effect. Indeed, 
judging by arrest records the share of criminal offences by women in the U.S. has 
increased over time. However, a careful interpretation of this evidence by 
Steffensmeier and Schwartz (2004) based on pooling data from several sources 





due primarily to increasing arrest rates for females. Similar evidence is presented 
by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) who show that the differences in the crime 
rates persist after the labor-force participation of women in the United States 
increased, which suggests that the equality/role thesis cannot explain these 
observations. Some researchers stress that female roles and crime can be seen 
as complex outcomes of socioeconomic, political and historical factors that go 
beyond gender equality (Steffensmeier et al., 1989). Furthermore, studies report 
evidence that female-male differences remain for adolescents being equally 
supervised by their parents (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Thus, as main 
factors for self-control, the authors go beyond supervision, stressing the 
relevance of recognition of deviant behavior, the willingness to expend the effort 
to correct it and the socializability of a person (see p. 149). Mears et al. (2000) 
also report a strong cross-cultural and historical robustness that reduces the 
strength of a possible equality or role theory:  
 
 “at every age, within all racial or ethnic groups examined to date, and for all but a 
handful of offense types that are peculiarly female… sex differences in delinquency 
are independently corroborated by self-report, victimization, and police data, and 
they appear to hold cross-culturally as well as historically” (p. 143).  
 
Two major factors can be found in the literature that try to explain gender 
differences: self-control and opportunities to commit criminal or reckless acts 





the restrictions to behave illegally, failing to consider carefully long-term negative 
consequences of the behavior. The opportunity argument is close to the concept 
of traditional economics, suggesting that males and females don’t have different 
motivations. Steffensmeier et al. (1998, p. 405) refers to a “maximalist” versus 
“minimalist” approach. The first group (maximalist) stresses that gender 
differences are due to fundamental differences at the cognitive, emotional and 
behavioral level due to biological, psychological, and experiential realities which 
lead to different approaches to handle issues and problems. The second group 
(minimalist) stresses that differences are due to different external constraints and 
opportunities. If only self-control was relevant, the gender differences would be 
constant from offense to offense (Zager, 1994). However, across offenses a 
variation among men and women is observed. On the other hand, Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990) criticize that crime cannot be largely a result of opportunity 
variables pointing out that women have similar opportunities to commit assault or 
homicide, as they spend much of their time in unsupervised activities (e.g., 
interaction with children) with a larger interaction with other people than men. 
Mears et al. (2000), influenced by the sociological theory of Sutherland (1947) 
who argues that delinquency is learned behavior imitating social groups, find in 
an empirical study that men are more likely than women to have delinquent 
friends and that they appeared to be more strongly influenced by delinquent 
peers.  
  It is highly interesting to investigate whether women’s justifiability of illegal 





criminology literature suggests against a cohort effect. As mentioned, we will 
have the chance to differentiate between an age and cohort effect in the data. 
Criminologists also indicate that age is negatively correlated with rule breaking. 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (2000) point out that, ‘no fact about crime is more widely 
accepted by criminologists. Virtually all of them, of whatever theoretical 
persuasion, appear to operate with a common image of the age distribution. This 
distribution thus represents one of the brute facts of criminology’ (p. 138). 
Similarly, Steffenmeier et al. (1992) argue that age is ‘one of the most robust 
predictors of rates of crime and delinquency’ (p. 308).  
Studies show that the shape of the distribution relating age and crime has 
remained  almost unchanged in the last 150 years and that the relationship is 
invariant across gender and race groups. This would suggest that we should be 
a b l e  t o  f i n d  a n  a g e  e f f e c t  i n  o u r  e m pirical part. Differences can be observed 
regarding the type of crime. For example, age is correlated with the seriousness 
of injury offenses but not with the seriousness of theft offenses. The peak 
regarding crimes against persons compared to theft is at a higher age 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; and Hirschi and Gottfredson, 2000). Similar 
tendencies can be observed for other involvements. For example, the relationship 
between crime and motor vehicle accidents (fatal traffic accidents) has a peak 
point in the late teens and steadily declines thereafter. However, contrary to 
crime, the fatality age curve is bimodal, beginning to increase around age sixty 





age is correlated with a lower tax evasion although a few studies imply no such 
influences (see Torgler and Schneider , 2007). 
There are two major concepts that explain the correlation between age and 
crime: the traditional desistance theory and the age theory (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990). The desistance theory asserts that the decline in crime occurs 
because factors associated with age reduce or change the actors’ criminality. 
Social position is a key explanation of an age effect according to that theory. 
Tittle (1980) argues that older people are more sensitive to the threats of 
sanctions and over the years have acquired greater social stakes, as material 
goods, status, a stronger dependency on the reactions from others, so that the 
potential costs of sanctions increase. However, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) 
survey studies conducted in a controlled environment (prison) which show that 
the age effect is comparable to the age effect outside a prison. This persistence 
indicates that status changes such as marriage, parenthood or employment are 
not sufficiently responsible for the observed decreases in criminality associated 
with age (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 2000). On the other hand, the age theory 
asserts that the decline cannot be explained by a change in the persons’ status or 
the exposure to anti-criminal institutions, which act to restrain offenders. The 
theory is based on the idea that the aging of the organism itself has an impact on 
individuals’ criminal behavior. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) are in favor of the 
aging theory stressing that differences in individuals’ criminal tendencies remain 






                                                    
Empirical Evidence 
The data used in the present study come from the WVS and EVS. The 
surveys were first conducted in 1981-84, with subsequent surveys being carried 
out in 1990-91, 1995-97 and 1999-2001. These surveys have assessed the basic 
values and beliefs of people around the world and have been carried out in about 
80 societies representing over 80 per cent of the world’s population. The 
researchers who conduct and administer the WVS/EVS in their respective 
countries are required to follow the methodological requirements of the World 
Values Association. Surveys are generally based on national representative 
samples of at least 1000 individuals, ages 18 and over (although sometimes 
people under the age of 18 participate). The samples are selected using 
probability random methods and the questions contained within the surveys 
generally do not deviate far from the original official questionnaire.
1 The 
WVS/EVS inquires about the acceptability of various dishonest or illegal activities. 
The questions on the justifiability of corruption and tax evasion that are of 
primary interest in this paper are stated as follows:  
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: (...) 
1.  Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. 
2.  Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
 
 





                                                    
The ten-scale index with the two extreme points “never justified” and “always 
justified” was recoded into a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 3 
standing for “never justifiable”; 4-10 were integrated in the value 0 due to a lack 
of variance. Thus, a higher value is interpreted as lower justifiability of corruption 
or tax evasion.  
Both variables are not free from biases and problems. In general, the proxy 
can be criticized as it considers a self-reported and hypothetical choice (see 
Swamy et al. 2001). It is possible that an individual who has been involved in 
illegal activities in the past will tend to excuse such behavior declaring a low 
justifiability (Torgler and Schneider 2007). Furthermore, cross-cultural 
comparisons should be treated with caution. In countries where corruption and 
tax evasion is widespread and delays in transactions are long, additional 
payments to “speed up” the process may be justifiable.
2 Nevertheless, in recent 
years a number of studies have investigated the effects of values, norms, and 
attitudes on economic behavior or institutions  (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 
1997). According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Lewis (1982) behavior can be 
predicted from attitudes and subjective norms. The tax compliance literature, for 
example, has documented a strong link between attitudes toward tax compliance 
and actual compliance.  Weck (1983) reports a negative correlation between tax 
morale (attitudes toward paying taxes) and the size of the shadow economy. 
 
2 De Soto (1989) and his research team conducted an experiment, setting up a small garment 
factory in Lima, intending to comply with the bureaucratic procedures and thus behave in 
accordance with the law. They were asked for a bribe to speed up the process 10 times and twice 






                                                    
Compared to other variables tax morale has the most significant impact on the 
s i z e  o f  t h e  s h a d o w  e c o n o m y .  I n  a  m u l t i v a r i a t e  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  
Taxpayer Opinion Survey,  using tax evasion as a dependent variable, Torgler 
(2003a) finds that tax morale significantly reduces tax evasion and Torgler 
(2001) finds a strong correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow 
economy. Moreover, because the way we define illegal activities is less sensitive 
than asking whether a person has evaded taxes or is corrupt, we expect the 
degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, the dataset is based on wide-ranging 
surveys, which reduces the probability of respondent suspicion and the framing 
effects (Torgler and Schneider 2006). For our purposes here, it is also useful to 
note that our justifiability of corruption variable is statistically significantly 
correlated with well-known indexes of the actual level of corruption such as the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (correlation coefficient is 
0.358) and the Quality of Government rating (Control of Corruption) developed 
by Kaufmann et al. (2003) (correlation coefficient 0.380).  
To investigate our research questions we combine surveys from different 
years together. We use the following countries in our empirical analysis: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain
3. The 
surveys have been conducted in the years 1981, 1990 and 1999 only in these 
countries. Thus, we have nine years between each survey, which allows us to 
build consistent cohort groups over time. We proceed as follows. We create five 
 






                                                    
dummy variables using the 1981 survey for age groups: 18-26, 27-35, 36-44, 
45-53, 54-62. Similarly, we create five dummy variables for the same cohort 
groups nine years later using the 1990 survey (age 27-35, 36-44, 45-53, 54-62, 
63-71) and five more using the 1999 survey (age 36-44, 45-53, 54-62, 63-71, 
72-80). The 14 dummy variables (excluding one reference group) are included in 
a model along with several control variables to explain the reported justifiability 
of illegal activities. To investigate whether there is a cohort effect, we can 
compare the same age group in different surveys, e.g., respondents aged 36-44 
in 1981, 1990, and 1999. Thus, the question here is not whether the same cohort 
of women changed their attitudes over time (an age effect) but whether women 
of similar age had different attitudes towards compliance in different time 
periods. Now, to observe an age effect, we compare the coefficients of the 
dummy variables for the same age group over time, e.g., female respondents 
with age 18-26 in the 1981 survey, with those aged 27-35 in the 1990 survey, 
and those aged 36-44 in the 1999 survey. Granted, these are not the same 
women being asked the same questions over time as in a longitudinal survey. 
However, tracking the attitudes of the same cohort over time using nationally 
representative surveys is the next best alternative.  
We will use an ordered probit estimation to analyze the ranking information 
of the scaled dependent variable. A weighting variable has been applied to correct 
the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national distribution
4. The models 
also include country dummy variables. Since the equation in an ordered probit 
 





model is nonlinear, only the signs of the coefficients can be directly interpreted 
and not their sizes. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find 
the quantitative effect of an independent variable. The marginal effect indicates 
the change in the share of individuals (or the probability of) belonging to a 
specific justifiability of corruption/tax evasion levels, when the independent 
variable increases by one unit. If the independent variable is a dummy variable, 
the marginal effect is evaluated in regard to the reference group. In all 
estimations the marginal effects are presented only for the highest social norm of 
bribing level (score of 3).  ‘I don’t know’ answers and missing values were 
omitted from all estimations. Moreover, the relatively high number of responses 
that illegal activities are never justifiable suggests the tendency of a natural cut-
off point at value with the lowest justifiability (score 3). Thus, we will also report 
the findings of a probit model in which our dependent variables take the value 1 
for a response that illegal activities are “never justified” and zero otherwise. The 
results remain robust.  
 
Independent Variables 
To isolate the impact of our main independent variables, the estimations 
reported in the next section control first of all for the education level, the marital 
status and the employment status of individuals. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides a description of these variables. The variable EDUCATION (continuous 





individuals might know more about the government’s activities and thus would be 
in a better position to assess the degree of corruption and tax evasion. This may 
have a positive or a negative impact on the justifiability of corruption and tax 
evasion, depending on how governments act. On the other hand, they may be 
more strongly involved in illegal activities, understanding better the opportunities 
of them. For example, fiscal knowledge may also positively influence the practice 
of avoidance (see Geeroms and Wilmots, 1985). Thus, the effect of education is 
not clear and the available evidence in the area of tax compliance is mixed (for an 
overview see Torgler, 2003b). The literature on corruption provides only a limited 
amount of evidence. Swamy et al. (2001), for example, do not include an 
education variable in the reported equations. Mocan (2004) finds that a higher 
level of education leads to a higher probability of being targeted for bribes.  
Marital status is a further control variable (dummy variable, value 1 if the 
respondent is married and 0 otherwise). Married people may be more compliant 
than others, especially compared to single people because they are more 
constrained by their social network (Tittle 1980). It is also argued that marriage 
alters public behavior (Swamy et al., 2001). Tittle (1980) finds significant 
differences between the various marital statuses. However, controlling for age, 
the results show that the association between deviance and marital status is a 
reflection of age difference, as older persons are more likely to be married or 
widowed and age was a strong predictor of deviance. Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990) also point out that in the literature on crime marital status does not seem 





As a proxy for income we use the economic situation of an individual 
(dummy variable for UPPER CLASS with the remaining individuals in the reference 
group). Using the exact income would produce biases, because this variable is not 
comparable across different countries. Individuals with a higher income are more 
likely to be asked for a bribe, as are those with a better education. Individuals 
with a lower income might have lower social “stakes” or restrictions but are less 
in a position to take risks because of a high marginal utility loss (wealth 
reduction) if they are caught and penalized behaving illegally. The literature on 
tax evasion has shown that depending on risk preferences and the progression of 
the income tax schedules, income may increase or reduce tax evasion (Torgler 
and Schneider, 2007). 
An important variable to include is the occupation status, as it allows us to 
take into consideration that women may disapprove corruption because they are 
less likely to be employed and thus less in the position to benefit from corruption 
(see Swamy et al., 2001). The literature on tax compliance suggests that self-
employed persons have higher compliance costs, which leads to a stronger 
incentive to evade taxes. Taxes are more visible for the self-employed, who have 
a higher opportunity to evade or avoid them. (Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
Thus, their willingness to comply may be lower. Being unemployed may have an 
impact on the norms regarding bribery. Being away from a job with its regular 
hours, restrictions, and compensations may increase the incentive to act illegally. 





self-employed individuals as they might be in the best position to invest in bribing 
and benefit from corruption.  
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the first results for both dependent variables. Four 
specifications are reported. In EQ1 and 3 we use the whole data set available to 
investigate gender differences. In EQ2 and EQ4 we control for a possible cohort 
and age effect investigating five different generations, using the 36 to 44 year old 
respondents in the 1999 survey as a reference group, i.e. all other dummy 
variable coefficients show the difference in attitudes between the reference group 
and the attitudes of another age group in the 1999 or another survey. In a first 
step, the four estimations are not controlling for the economic classes, due to the 
fact that the economic class variable has a relatively high number of missing 
values. Looking at all regression, we find a strong gender effect. Being a woman 
increases the probability of stating that corruption or tax evasion is never 
justifiable between 5.8 and 7.1 percentage points. Thus, we observe a strong 
quantitative effect. EQ1 and 3 also indicate a statistically significant age effect. 
EQ2 and 4 provide further insights differentiating between a cohort and age 
effect. Looking at GENERATION 1, we observe that there is a strong age effect. 
Greater age is correlated with a lower justifiability of corruption and tax evasion. 
The proportion of persons aged 18-26 in 1981 who report the lowest justifiability 
of corruption (highest social norm) and tax evasion (tax morale) is more than 15 





years later. Similarly, the same cohort group reports a higher justifiability of 
illegal activities in 1990 compared to 1999, with marginal effects around 5 
percentage points. Thus, we not only observe statistically significant coefficients 
and relatively high marginal effects, but also an increase of the marginal effects 
over time. To check whether there is also a cohort effect we compare the 
reference group (age 36-44 in year 1999) with the same age categories in 1981 
(GENERATION 2) and in 1990 (GENERATION 3). The coefficient estimates for 
corruption are in most of the cases negative (-0.042 and –0.077 for corruption, -
0.074 and 0.013 for tax evasion) and the coefficients are never statistically 
significant. Thus, focusing on men and women, we observe an age effect but no 
cohort effect.  The age effect is additionally supported when focusing on age 
groups higher than 36-44 in other generations (especially for the justifiability of 
tax evasion).  
  Looking at the control variables in Table 1 we find a statistically significant 
effect of EDUCATION on the JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION, but not on the 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF TAX EVASION. In both cases, married people have also a 
higher social norm regarding illegal activities (lower justifiability) than individuals 
with another marital status. Being married increases the share of persons 
indicating that accepting a bribe is never justifiable by more than 3 percentage 
points and increases the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justifiable 
by more than 4 percentage points. Thus, we observe similar quantitative effects. 
On the other hand, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the 





regarding the justifiability of evading taxes. Specifically, being self-employed 
increases the justifiability of evading taxes quite substantially (marginal effects 
around 5 percentage points).   
Table 1: Gender Effect 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE JUSTIFIABILITY  OF CORRUPTION  JUSTIFIABILITY  OF  TAX EVASION 












EQ1 EQ2  EQ3  EQ4 
a) Demographic Factors                             
WOMAN 0.177***  9.17  0.058  0.182***  7.96  0.058  0.179***  10.44  0.071  0.171***  8.49  0.068 
AGE 0.014***  21.16  0.004          0.014***  25.40  0.005      
GENERATION 1                        
AGE 18-26 YEAR 1981        -0.417*** -9.51 -0.15       -0.262*** -6.64 -0.104 
AGE 27-35 YEAR 1990        -0.111** -2.18  -0.04      -0.139*** -3.02 -0.055 
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1999        Reference group         Reference group  
GENERATION 2                        
AGE 27-35 YEAR 1981        -0.299*** -5.87 -0.103       -0.148*** -3.15  -0.059 
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1990       -0.042 -0.79  -0.01        -0.074 -1.56  -0.030 
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1999       0.058 1.14  0.018        0.090***  2.13  0.035 
GENERATION 3                         
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1981        -0.077 -1.34  -0.03        0.013 0.25  0.005 
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1990        0.11* 1.88  0.034        0.027  0.54  0.011 
AGE 54-62 YEAR 1999       0.107** 2.01  0.033        0.153***  3.42  0.060 
GENERATION 4                         
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1981        0.007 0.11  0.002        0.191***  3.55  0.075 
AGE 54-62 YEAR 1990       0.254*** 4.12 0.075       0.119***  2.28  0.047 
AGE 63-71 YEAR 1999        0.276*** 4.85 0.081       0.292***  6.04  0.113 
GENERATION 5                         
AGE 54-62 YEAR 1981       0.046 0.73  0.015         0.286*** 5.08  0.111 
AGE 63-71 YEAR 1990        0.281*** 4.12 0.082       0.254***  4.40  0.099 
AGE 71-80 YEAR 1999        0.295*** 4.19 0.085       0.386***  6.56  0.147 
EDUCATION 0.015***  5.36  0.005  0.009***  2.72  0.003  0.002  0.79  0.001  -0.002  -0.72  -0.001 
b) Marital Status                        
MARRIED 0.133***  6.53  0.044  0.100***  3.8  0.032  0.115***  6.41  0.046  0.110***  4.69  0.044 
c) Employment Status                        
SELFEMPLOYED -0.034  -0.92  -0.011  -0.056  -1.34  -0.018 -0.131*** -4.02 -0.052  -0.128*** -3.52 -0.051 
UNEMPLOYED -0.065  -1.64  -0.022  -0.092*  -1.84  -0.03  -0.062*  -1.71  -0.025  -0.043  -0.95  -0.017 
Country Dummies  yes        yes        yes                
Number of observations  33525      24911      33624      24967      
Prob > chi2  0.00      0.000      0.000      0.000      
Pseudo R2  0.040        0.0385        0.036        0.029       
Notes: Robust standard errors. AGE 36-44 YEAR 1999 is the reference group in EQ2 and EQ4. Other reference groups: MALE, OTHER MARRIED 
STATUS, HER EMPLOYMENT STATUS. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score 
(JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION AND JUSTIFIABILITY OF TAX EVASION=3). JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION/TAX EVASION (TAX 





Next,  Table 2 reports several robustness checks for the gender effect 
summarizing the results of 30 regressions (see EQ5 to 34). The first result 
column focuses on the justifiability of corruption, the second on the justifiability of 
tax evasion (tax morale). This allows us to get a broader picture of gender 
differences. For simplicity, in most of the cases only the coefficient for the 
variable WOMAN is reported. First, we use a probit instead of an ordered probit 
model (EQ5 to 8). A relatively high number of responses stating that corruption 
and tax evasion is never justifiable allows the use of a probit model in which our 
dependent variables take the value 1 for a response that illegal activities are 
never justifiable and zero otherwise. As can be seen, the coefficient WOMAN 
remains highly statistically significant with similar marginal effects (between 5.5 
and 6.4 percentage points).  
Next,  Table 2 reports estimations using each of the years in our sample 
(1981, 1990 and 1999) separately (EQ9 to 14). The role theory would suggest 
that a greater equality of status between men and women over time would lead 
to decreasing gender differences. However, such an argument is not supported by 
our results. Gender differences remain statistically significant in all three time 
periods and we cannot observe a decay in the marginal effects over time. The tax 
morale variable even indicates an increase of the marginal effects (5.5 to 8.5 
percentage points). Thus, focusing on different time periods supports the 
previous findings of a gender effect.  
We also investigate every single country in our data set (EQ15 to 30). 





established greater equality (e.g., stronger labor force participation or stronger 
involvement in the political process etc.). Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix 
report that Denmark and The Netherlands have the highest percentage of women 
in the parliament and Italy and France the lowest. Denmark and Italy also have 
the highest and lowest female labor force participation. The results in Table 1, 
however, indicate a relatively robust gender effect among all the countries. 
R e g i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  c a n  o n l y  b e  l o c a l i z e d  w h e n  f o c u s i n g  o n  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
effects. Looking at corruption all coefficients are statistically significant with 
marginal effects between 4.5 (Italy) and 9.4 (Belgium). Similar results are 
observable for tax evasion. The marginal effects vary between 0.8 (Italy) and 13 
percentage points (Denmark). Overall, social democratic states such as Denmark 
and The Netherlands show high marginal effects. Only in one case the coefficient 
was not statistically significant. Surprisingly, it was Italy a country from the south 
with a certain history of patronage.  Overall, we cannot observe that greater 
equality is connected with lower gender differences.  
Finally, we extend the previous EQ2 and 4 by including additional control 
variables (EQ31 to 38). First, we include a proxy for the economic situation 
(UPPER CLASS). This variable was not included in our models originally as it 
reduces the number of observations (from 24911 to 21820 (corruption) and 
24967 to 21681 (tax evasion)). Gender differences are not affected by adding 
individuals’ economic situation. The coefficient is still highly statistically significant 
with robust marginal effects (no change for corruption, slight reduction from 6.8 





                                                    
that of education, i.e. the highest economic class has the lowest justifiability of 
corruption with a marginal effect of 2.3 percentage points. On the other hand, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant focusing on the justifiability of tax evasion 
(also in line with the variable education).  
 
The next three estimations in Table 2 still control for the economic situation 
but we also add variables for trust in the state and national pride. Torgler and 
Schneider (2007) show that these are key variables to understand the level of tax 
morale. The first four estimations focus on trust. The relationship between 
taxpayers and government can be seen as a relational or psychological contract, 
which involves strong emotional ties and loyalties. Taxes are a price paid for 
government actions and maintenance of a fair legal system. If taxpayers trust the 
state institutions, they are more willing to be honest. We are going to use two 
proxies that measure individuals’ trust: trust in the legal system and trust in the 
parliament
5. The last one focuses on national pride. The sense of group 
identification produced by national pride encourages cooperative behavior and 
thereby influences citizen behavior in groups, organizations, and societies (Tyler 
2000). We can also expect that these factors affect the justifiability of corruption 
in a similar manner. A stronger legitimacy of the political system reduces the 
justifiability of corruption. In line with Torgler and Schneider (2007) we have 
included these groups of variables sequentially in the estimations to reduce 
 
5 Corresponding question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal 
system/parliament: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, 






possible criticism of conceptual similarities between them and our two dependent 
variables. All six estimations report statistically significant coefficients for the 
legitimacy of the state system, with higher marginal effects for the dependent 
variable tax morale. The coefficient WOMAN remains statistically significant 
showing marginal effects between 6 and 9.1 percentage points for tax morale and 





Table 2: Robustness Check 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  JUSTIFIABILITY   
OF 
   JUSTIFIABILITY 
OF 
     
   CORRUPTION   TAX  EVASION  
ROBUSTNESS CHECK  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
EQ5 – EQ34       Effects    Effects
INDEPENDENT V. (ALL OTHER CONTROLLED)               
MODEL: PROBIT INSTEAD OF ORDERED PROBIT 
(EQ5 – 8)  
             
Structure in line with EQ1/EQ3               
WOMAN  0.173*** 8.62  0.056  0.160*** 8.74  0.064 
Structure in line with EQ2/4 
           
WOMAN  0.172*** 7.26  0.055  0.147*** 6.82  0.058 
YEAR (EQ9-14)               
1981               
WOMAN  0.213*** 6.11  0.072  0.141*** 4.40  0.055 
1990               
WOMAN  0.123*** 3.46  0.040  0.195*** 6.23  0.078 
1999               
WOMAN  0.196*** 6.79  0.060  0.213*** 8.41  0.085 
COUNTRIES (EQ15-30)               
FRANCE               
WOMAN  0.190*** 4.09  0.071  0.214*** 4.81  0.085 
GREAT BRITAIN               
WOMAN  0.184*** 3.51  0.055  0.218*** 4.61  0.086 
ITALY               
WOMAN 0.140***  3.28  0.045  0.022  0.59  0.008 
THE NETHER LANDS               
WOMAN  0.250*** 4.51  0.088  0.206*** 4.00  0.081 
DENMARK             
WOMAN  0.413*** 4.84  0.058  0.348*** 6.17  0.130 
BELGIUM             
WOMAN  0.249*** 5.31  0.094  0.144*** 2.91  0.053 
IRELAND          
WOMAN 0.235***  3.13  0.061  0.259***  4.19  0.103 
SPAIN               
WOMAN  0.143*** 4.03  0.043  0.156*** 5.01  0.062 
ADDITIONAL CONTROL V. BASED ON EQ. 2/4            
INCLUDING ECONONOMIC  SITUATION  (EQ31 – 38)          
UPPER CLASS  0.069**  2.54  0.023  0.034  1.38  0.013 
WOMAN  0.177*** 7.34  0.058  0.162*** 7.50  0.064 
TRUST SYSTEM  0.038** 2.58  0.013  0.117***  8.83  0.046 
WOMAN  0.169*** 6.95  0.056  0.151*** 6.92  0.091 
TRUST PARLIAMENT 
0.027* 1.79  0.009  0.096***  7.07  0.038 
WOMAN  0.175*** 7.18  0.058  0.150*** 6.83  0.06 
NATIONAL PRIDE  0.079*** 5.02  0.026  0.153*** 10.67  0.061 
WOMAN  0.165*** 6.63  0.054  0.154*** 6.91  0.061 
Notes: 30 estimations, control variables not reported. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Marginal effect ordered probit estimations = highest score (JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION AND JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
TAX EVASION=3). JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION/TAX EVASION (TAX MORALE): the higher the value the lower 





After observing a strong and robust gender effect, we take a closer look at 
different women generations with the objective to investigate further the cohort 
and age effects specifically for female respondents. Table 3 presents these 
results. In the first and third regression of the table we use the 36 to 44 year old 
women in the 1999 survey as a reference group for both dependent variables. 
The only difference in the second and forth regression is that we use a different 
reference group: those 45-53 in 1999. The results of all these estimations are the 
same. However, reporting estimations using a different reference group makes 
the interpretation of coefficients more straightforward and allows us to check the 
robustness of the results. To better visualize the results, age and cohort effects 
are in bold, additionally the age effect in italics. In line with Table 1, we are not 
able to find a cohort effect, but observe an age effect. Comparing women’s age 
group 36-44 in the year 1999 with the same age group in 1990 (GENERATION 2) 
and 1981 (GENERATION 3) leads to the conclusion that there is no cohort effect 
(coefficients are not significantly different). Similarly, comparing the age group 
45-53 in 1999 of the GENERATION 2 (reference group) with the same age group 
in 1981 (GENERATION 4) and 1990 (GENERATION 3) leads to similar results. On 
the other hand, looking at the results under the heading GENERATION 1 shows 
that being at the age of 36-44 in 1999 rather than 18-26 in 1981 increases the 
probability of arguing that accepting a bribe or cheating on taxes is never 
justifiable by 15.7 and 9 percentage points. GENERATION 2 also indicates that 
the probability of stating that corruption or tax evasion is never justifiable is 





reference group (age 45-53 year 1999). However, statistical significant 
differences between our reference groups (age 36-44 YEAR 1999 and age 45-53 




This empirical study uses the World Values Survey and the European Values 
Survey data covering eight Western European countries spanning the period from 
1981 to 1999 to shed some light on the extent to which citizens perceive 
corruption and tax evasion as a justifiable phenomenon. The major goals of the 
paper are to investigate whether gender matters and whether the gender effect is 
related to the age groups in different time periods (cohort effect) or changing 
attitudes of the same cohorts over time (age effect). Furthermore, the 
multivariate analysis allows us to isolate the impact of these effects from other 
“life-course” explanations such as marriage, employment, education or economic 
situation. Despite an increasing interest in the determinants of corruption and tax 
evasion and contrary to the criminology literature, this aspect has been widely 
neglected in the economics literature. Thus, it is highly relevant to investigate 
empirically this question as previous studies working mostly with cross-sectional 
data have failed to separate the age and cohort effects. 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  w e  f i n d  e v i d e n c e  f o r  strong gender differences. Women are 
significantly less likely to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes can be 





(presenting 34 different estimations). The results have some interesting political 
implications. Increasing the number of women in the government or the public 
administration may help to reduce the level of corruption, which would benefit 
society. However, such a recommendation or policy implication should be treated 
with caution. Although we tested the robustness in detail, it is still possible that 
other factors are causing the differences. For example, the relationship between 
gender and illegal activities may decrease after controlling for additional 
characteristics such as risk attitudes. Moreover, the limited number of studies in 
the area of corruption provides a somewhat mixed picture and more evidence in 
line with the criminology literature is required to provide a solid policy 
recommendation.  
Focusing on women’s willingness to comply, we were not able to find 
differences in women’s attitudes among similar age groups in different time 
periods. Thus, the results don’t support a cohort effect. However, we could 
observe a strong and robust age effect. Thus, our results are not in line with the 
equality and role theory that would suggest a decrease of gender differences with 
greater equality of status between men and women over time. Our results were 
also supported when focusing independently on different time periods in Table 2. 
We also observed an age rather than a cohort effect when investigating the entire 
data set (men and women) in Table 1.  
How is this result explained, taking into account that we live in a rapidly 
changing world? One reason could be that in a highly developed and stable region 





Focusing on developing and transition countries, where women were faced with 
greater changes during our investigated period of 18 years, may lead to different 
results. The strong economic, social and cultural changes in these regions in the 
last decades have lead to new opportunities and a new role for women in society 
(Abramo and Valenzuela 2005).  For example, in Latin America 33 million women 
joined the labor force between 1990 and 2004 (Abramo and Valenzuela 2005, p. 
373). Unfortunately, the WVS/EVS does not allow us to investigate developing 
and transition countries in such a consistent manner as done in this study, 
covering a period of 18 years. Thus, our present study is a first attempt to 
examine how cohort and age effects affect attitudes towards corruption and tax 
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Table 3: Women’s Willingness to Comply over Time 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
JUSTIFIABILITY  OF CORRUPTION 
JUSTIFIABILITY  OF TAX EVASION 
  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.
WEIGHTED ORDERED      Effects    Effects    Effects    Effects
PROBIT                             
   EQ39 EQ40  EQ41 EQ42 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
                           
a) Demographic Factors                             
GENERATION 1                         
AGE 18-26 YEAR 1981   -0.453*** -6.40  -0.157 -0.501*** -6.66 -0.175 -0.228*** -3.55  -0.090  -0.330*** -4.92 -0.131
AGE 27-35 YEAR 1990   -0.129 -1.61  -0.042 -0.177** -2.12 -0.058 -0.127* -1.78  -0.050  -0.230*** -3.13 -0.091
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1999   reference  group    -0.048  -0.59  -0.015 reference  group    -0.103  -1.45  -0.041
GENERATION 2                  
AGE 27-35 YEAR 1981   -0.269***  -3.32  -0.090 -0.317*** -3.76 -0.107 -0.108 -1.48  -0.043  -0.210*** -2.82 -0.084
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1990  -0.020 -0.24  -0.006 -0.069 -0.80  -0.022 0.027 0.37  0.011  -0.075 -0.99  -0.030
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1999  0.048  0.59  0.015  reference  group    0.103  1.45  0.040  reference  group   
GENERATION 3                  
AGE 36-44 YEAR 1981   0.030 0.34  0.009  -0.018 -0.20  -0.006 0.067 0.84  0.026  -0.036 -0.45  -0.014
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1990   0.074  0.84  0.023  0.025 0.28  0.008  0.085 1.09  0.033  -0.017 -0.22  -0.007
AGE  54-62  YEAR  1999  0.102  1.10 0.031  0.054  0.57 0.017  0.100  1.30 0.039  -0.002  -0.03  -0.001
GENERATION 4                  
AGE 45-53 YEAR 1981   -0.043  -0.47  -0.014 -0.092 -0.97  -0.030 0.130 1.60  0.050  0.027 0.33  0.011 
AGE  54-62  YEAR  1990  0.303***  3.08 0.086  0.254** 2.55 0.073  0.169**  2.07 0.065  0.066  0.81 0.026 
AGE  63-71  YEAR  1999    0.371***  3.96 0.102  0.322***  3.40 0.090  0.215***  2.62 0.083  0.113  1.36 0.044 
GENERATION 5                  
AGE  54-62  YEAR  1981  0.063  0.66 0.019  0.015  0.15 0.005  0.180**  2.13 0.070  0.078  0.91 0.030 
AGE  63-71  YEAR  1990    0.171  1.62 0.051  0.123  1.15 0.037  0.171*  1.89 0.066  0.069  0.76 0.027 
AGE  71-80  YEAR  1999    0.318***  2.74 0.089  0.270** 2.31 0.077  0.305***  3.05 0.116  0.203** 2.01 0.078 
EDUCATION  0.011*  1.89 0.004  0.011*  1.89 0.004  -0.015*** -2.90  -0.006  -0.015*** -2.90  -0.006
b) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.042  1.08 0.013  0.042  1.08 0.013  0.043  1.25 0.017  0.043  1.25 0.017 
c) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED -0.163**  -2.01  -0.054 -0.163**  -2.01  -0.054 -0.200***  -2.82 -0.079  -0.200*** -2.82 -0.079
UNEMPLOYED -0.179**  -2.22  -0.059 -0.179**  -2.22  -0.059 -0.066  -0.87 -0.026  -0.066  -0.87 -0.026
d) Economic Variables                  
UPPER  CLASS  0.081**  2.08 0.025  0.081** 2.08 0.025  0.015  0.45 0.006  0.015  0.45 0.006 
Country Dummies  yes        yes        yes        yes       
Number of observations  11451       11451       11480       11480      
Prob > chi2  0.000       0.000       0.000       0.000      
Pseudo R2  0.032       0.032        0.020        0.020       
Notes: Robust standard errors. AGE 36-44 YEAR 1999 is the reference group in EQ. 36 and EQ. 38, AGE AGE 45-53 YEAR 1999 in in EQ. 
37 and EQ. 39. Other reference groups: MALE, OTHER MARRIED STATUS, HER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, LOWER CLASSES. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
CORRUPTION AND JUSTIFIABILITY OF TAX EVASION=3). JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION/TAX EVASION (TAX 
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Variable Derivation 
AGE DUMMIES 
AGE 30-49, AGE 50-64, 65+ (reference group, AGE < 30) 
GENDER  FEMALE (MALE in the reference group) 
EDUCATION Continuous  variable 
At what age did you or will you complete your full time 
education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please 
exclude apprenticeships 
 
MARITAL STATUS  DUMMY: MARRIED=1, all other classes (divorced, separated, widowed, single) in the 
reference group. 
 
Economic  CLASS  People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle 
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 
 
DUMMY: UPPER CLASS and UPPER MIDDLE CLASS, the rest (lower middle class, 
working class and lower class) is the reference group. 
OCCUPATION STATUS  TWO DUMMIES: SELFEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, the rest (part time employed, at home, 
student, retired, other) is in the reference group.  
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